Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions Standards: Walking on Thin Ice? by Chen, Y et al.
Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions
Standards: Walking on Thin Ice?
Yihsu Chen Makoto Tanakay Afzal S. Siddiquiz
June 8, 2016
Abstract
Climate policy, like climate change itself, is subject to debate. Partially due
to the political deadlock in Washington, DC, US climate policy, historically, has
been driven mainly by state or regional eort until the recently introduced federal
Clean Power Plan (CPP). Instead of a traditional mass-based standard, the US CPP
stipulates a state-specic performance-based CO2 emission standard and delegates
considerable exibility to the states in achieving the standard. Typically, there are
two sets of policy tools available: a tradable performance-based and a mass-based
permit program. We analyze these two related but distinct standards when they are
subject to imperfect competition in the product and/or permit markets. Stylized
models are developed to produce general conclusions. Detailed models that ac-
count for heterogenous technologies and the transmission network are developed to
evaluate policy eciency. Depending on the scenarios under consideration, the re-
sulting problem could be either a complementarity problem or a Stackelberg leader-
follower game, which is implemented as a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC). We overcome the nonconvexity of MPECs by reformulating
them as mixed integer problems. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent
in the performance-based standard that might eectively reduce power prices, it
could inate energy demand, thereby rendering permits scarce. When the leader in
a Stackelberg formulation has a relatively clean endowment under the performance-
based standard, its ability to manipulate the electricity market as well as to lower
permit prices might worsen the market outcomes compared to its mass-based coun-
terpart. On the other hand, when the leader has a relatively dirty endowment,
the \cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare
compared to the mass-based program. This paper contributes to the current policy
debates in regulating emissions from the US power sector and highlights dierent
incentives created by the mass- and performance-based standards.
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1 Introduction
Regulating emissions is challenging because the negative externality of pollution is not
fully internalized by the producers in a market so that more pollution is emitted than
socially optimal. In order to address this externality, two types of governmental interven-
tions are typically considered: command-and-control (C&C) and market-based policies.
While the former mandates the installation of a specic control technology, the latter stip-
ulates an emissions limit on sources beyond which a penalty will be imposed. Examples
of technology standards, one type of C&C, include scrubbers and selective non-catalytic
reduction systems (SNCRs) for SO2 and NOx emissions from power plants under the US
Clean Air Act (CAA). Industry would favor the performance standard over the technol-
ogy one due to its exibility, whereas government might be inclined to set the technology
standard if the transaction cost is substantially higher under the performance standard.
While the market-based policy is a generic label for various types of environmental
standards that take advantage of competition in the polluting industries, it generally refers
to price and quantity instruments. The price instrument, commonly known as a \tax,"
acts as a cost adder that penalizes polluting industries by internalizing pollution damage.
The second type (known as cap-and-trade (C&T)) regulates the pollution quantity, in
which a regulatory body rst allocates property rights of emitting pollutions, i.e., permits
or allowances, to aected facilities by either auctioning, grandfathering, or a combination
of the two. These facilities need to demonstrate their compliance by surrendering sucient
allowances to cover their emissions at the end of each compliance cycle, e.g., the annual cap
for SO2 and summer months for NOx. The allowances can be traded freely in secondary
markets such as the SO2 trading program under the CAA, the European Union Emission
Trading System (EU ETS), CO2 trading, and renewable energy credit (REC) trading
under several state-level renewable portfolio standards (RPS).
Economists have long advocated for market-based approaches on the grounds of eco-
nomic eciency. A number of frequently cited advantages of market-based instruments
over C&C policies include equating marginal abatement cost, static eciency, dynamic
eciency, and double dividend, thereby inducing technology adoption (Stavins, 1995;
Parry et al., 1997). However, a tax and C&T are fundamentally dierent since the level
of an emissions tax is pre-set by an authority and exogenous to the product market.
By contrast, permit prices uctuate constantly reecting market participants' expecta-
tions concerning demand and supply conditions. Comparison of the tax and the C&T
has, therefore, received considerable attention following early work by Weitzman (1974).
Mansur (2013) shows that, in contrast to a tax, the polluters' decisions under a tradable
permits system would aect the permit price, which might actually increase a strategic
rm's output, thereby leading to a lower deadweight loss relative to a tax system. Green
(2008) examines market risks faced by generators under the tax and permits systems with
the nding that a tax increases (decreases) the volatility for a fossil-fuel (nuclear) plant.
Chen and Tseng (2011) conclude that price volatility under a C&T would induce early
adoption of clean technology compared to a tax. While the eciency properties of these
two types of policies are well known through years of research, the newly introduced the
US federal Clean Power Plan (CPP) brings a new dimension, which is the focus of this
paper.
Due to its federal structure along with recent political gridlock, the US has seen climate
policy driven forward largely based on regional eorts, e.g., the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern United States and California Assembly Bill (AB) 32.
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In contrast, the CPP is a new federal-level policy introduced by the US Environmental
Protection Agency to cut CO2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel power plants by 30%
below 2005 levels by 2030. While the proposal establishes a state-specic target with
various building blocks that lay out possible reduction strategies, it leaves states and the
power sector with considerable exibility in attaining their targets. More specically, a
state can decide to adopt either 1) a default performance-based standard under which tons
of CO2 emissions per MWh of electricity generated is measured, or 2) an equivalent mass-
based standard, such as in a C&T regime based on GDP growth projections. Furthermore,
those states will form an alliance that allows them to trade either under a \mass-based"
or a \performance-based" standard.
Economic theory suggests that the two approaches would provide incentives that might
alter a rm's production decisions in a very dierent way (Bushnell et al., 2014). In
particular, similar to an RPS, a \performance-based" standard involves cross-subsidies
from high-emitting sources to low-emitting sources (Tanaka and Chen, 2013; Siddiqui
et al., 2016). In the case where a generating unit's emission rate is greater than the
performance standard, it will need to pay a cost to cover its emissions, thereby eectively
elevating its marginal cost of production. On the other hand, when a generator's emission
rate is less than the performance standard, the negative cost becomes a subsidy that
eectively lowers its production cost, thereby making the generator more competitive.
This eectively lowers the marginal costs of those low-emitting units, which are more
likely to have high marginal costs in the production merit order. As those units are
the typically price-setting marginal units, the policy would likely lower the power price,
thereby inating energy demand. The tradable performance-based standard under the
CPP is called emission rate credits (ERCs) with a physical unit of $/MWh. Given a
policy rate of Epolicy, for a generating unit with an emission rate of E, producing 1 MWh
of energy will be equivalent to generating E
policy E
Epolicy
ERCs, either positive or negative.
When a state opts for implementing this tradable performance-based standard, it will
comply with policy by collecting a non-negative net ERC.1
One emerging issue that has received little attention is the possibility of strategic
behavior under the tradable performance-based standard as well as its repercussions for
the product market. The consequences of market power can include price distortions,
production ineciencies, and a redistribution of income from consumers to suppliers. In
fact, the distribution of economic rent or welfare analysis needs further attention when
comparing performance- with mass-based standards. In particular, while the government
collects all the proceedings from auctioning o mass-based tradable permits, the tradable
performance-based standard is inherently revenue neutral since it involves transfers of
economic rent from high-emitting to low-emitting units. This paper analyzes the eciency
properties of the CPP tradable performance-based standard under imperfect competition
and compares it to the traditional mass-based policies. Several scenarios are considered,
diering by their assumptions concerning 1) types of tradable permit markets (e.g., mass-
or performance-based standard) and 2) whether rms possess market power in the power
and the permit markets. If rms are allowed to exercise market power in the permit
1Zhang et al. (2016) address the equivalence between an RPS-type performance-based and a mass-
based permit system and its eciency properties. In particular, while a joint tradable performance-based
standard with more than two regions with dierent policy rates is believed to allow for equating marginal
abatement cost of the two regions (i.e., equivalent ERC permit prices) through permit tradings, Zhang
et al. (2016) show that, under some conditions, this could lead to dierent ERC permit prices, thereby
undermining the eciency of a joint performance-based permit program. They, therefore, conclude that
a joint mass-based tradable permit program will perform better on the grounds of economic eciency.
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market, then a Stackelberg-type of leader-follower formulation is considered where a leader
could fully and correctly anticipate reactions by followers, including follower producers,
system operator, and consumers.
The paper proceeds in two ways. First, stylized duopoly models considering a performance-
based policy are developed to produce generalized theories. Second, more structured mod-
els that are generalized to more than two rms and account for the fact that rms might
own multiple facilities with dierent emission intensities and compete in a transmission-
constrained network are developed to reect more realistic market conditions.
The general conclusion from the stylized analysis indicates that the outcomes of the
Cournot duopoly lie between that of the perfect competition and Stackelberg ones when
a performance-based allowance market is considered. That is, the power price is highest
in the Stackelberg followed by the Cournot and perfect competition, while the the total
emission and output are in a reversed order. These ndings are in contrast to the general
observation that the outcomes of Stackelberg lie between least competitive Cournot and
perfect competition when only a product market is considered. Interestingly, the strategy
undertaken by a Stackelberg leader depends on its emission rate relative to the policy
rate. In particular, when its emission rate is lower than the policy rate, it would withhold
its output, and reduce allowance supply, thereby leading to a higher allowance price.
Nevertheless, the simplied duopoly models do not allow us to evaluate social surplus
among dierent policy choices (i.e., mass, and performance-based) or market structures
(i.e., perfect, Cournot and Stackelberg competition) as the damage caused by pollution
is not explicitly accounted for. To overcome this, we turn our attention to the detailed
modeling by equating the amount of total emission across dierent scenarios to that of the
Stackelberg case under performance-based policy. In a way, the \Stackelberg-performance-
based" scenario serves as a benchmark case. We have following central ndings of the
paper from our detailed modeling. While the property of cross-subsidy inherent in the
performance-based standard might eectively reduce power prices, its ination of the
energy demand might create scarcity in the permit market. When the leader has a rela-
tively clean endowment under the performance-based standard, its ability to manipulate
the market might worsen the market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart.
On the other hand, when the leader has a relatively dirty endowment, the \cross-subsidy"
could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare compared to its mass-based
counterpart.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant
literature. In Section 3, we present a qualitative analysis based on stylized models. The
formulation of detailed models is given in Section 4. A case analysis based on a simplied
three-node example is implemented in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
There is a rich body of research studying mass-based tradable permit policies (Sartzetakis,
1997; Misiolek and Elder, 1989; Hahn, 1984; von der Fehr, 1993; Chen and Hobbs, 2005;
Chen et al., 2006). Their overall conclusion is that market power in a mass-based standard
could be a concern as it distorts the permit price, and the eect could spill over to the
product market, thereby leading to signicant ineciencies. On the other hand, research
concerning market power in tradable performance standards is relatively thin, partially
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due to the fact that the policy is less common.2 Focusing on RPS standards rather than
performance-based standards directly, Tanaka and Chen (2013) apply a dominant-fringe
framework to analyze market power in tradable RECs. The paper shows that market
power could have signicant impacts on the REC and power prices. In particular, when
a non-renewable generator is a dominant rm and a renewable generator is a competitive
fringe, the former has a strong incentive to lower the REC price, e.g., even to zero, in
order to avoid REC costs. The zero REC price would negate price impacts in the power
market, thereby mitigating market power of the dominant rm. However, they note that
this could lead to an underinvestment in renewables in the long run as subsidies received
by renewables in form of the RECs vanish. Siddiqui et al. (2016) take the perspective of
a regulator in setting the optimal RPS target. Via a bi-level model, they demonstrate
that compared to a rst-best policy of curbing consumption, the use of RPS results in
the deployment of \too much" renewable energy. Consequently, the potential exercise of
market power by a non-renewable producer may actually improve social surplus vis-a-vis
a market setting with perfect competition.
In contrast to the analysis of the mass-based standard, only recently did work on
performance-based standards receive some attention due to policy debates about the
CPP. Bushnell et al. (2014) focus on states' incentives for adopting tradable performance-
or mass-based standards. Their focus is on the strategic choices by states that are in
the same interconnected power market to adopt dierent standards. They conclude that
the performance-based standard is a dominant strategy by states while a single regional
cap will be a Nash equilibrium. Their numerical simulation of the US Western electricity
market also nd that a mix of performance- and mass-based standards by states within an
interconnected power market might lead to emissions leakage. Their results highlight the
challenges of the exibility introduced by the CPP as well as the benet of coordination
among states.
Bushnell et al. (2014) is closely related to Fischer (2003a), who analyzes carbon trad-
ing between mass- and performance-based standards and shows that 1) unlimited trade
between two types of the standards can raise combined emissions if the goods produced
by the industries of the two programs are independent, and 2) the combined emissions,
however, could decline if those goods are substitutes and when the eect of own-price
elasticity is greater than that of the cross-price elasticity. In a sense, the denition of
\sector" in Fischer (2003a) is equivalent to \state," as each state decides to go either
with a performance- or mass-based program. However, the general nding (2) in Fischer
(2003a) is dicult to apply to the situation in Bushnell et al. (2014). This is mainly
because power trading is constrained by the thermal capacity of the transmission lines so
that the magnitude of the cross-price elasticity is not easy to gauge even when the power
produced by dierent facilities is perfectly substitutable when available.
Burtraw et al. (2015) examine coordination problems under the CPP using a detailed
partial-equilibrium investment operational model of the US electricity sector. While hold-
ing the rest of the US constant with its respective emissions rate standards, the paper
focuses on policy options in the upper Midwest as the region is subject to a mix of
cost-of-service regulation and deregulated industry structures. They show that when the
2Fischer (2003b) compares three similar output-based rebating programs in the presence of imperfect
competition in product markets: tradable performance standards, emissions taxes with rebates according
to output share, and output-allocated emissions permits. The paper nds that for a given emission target,
output-based rebating raises the marginal abatement cost relative to an ecient policy. In her setting,
the tradable performance standard market is assumed to perfectly competitive.
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upper Midwest adopts some form of mass-based standard, the performance-based stan-
dard oers the rest of the US a substantial cost advantage, thereby causing operations and
investments to shift away from the mass-based regions. The possibility of higher national
emissions is also noted.
An earlier study by Holland et al. (2009), within a dierent context, analyzes the fed-
eral low carbon fuel standard (LCFS), a performance-based policy to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions by limiting the carbon intensity of fuels in the transportation sector. The
paper concludes that the policy could possibly lead to increasing net carbon emissions as
decreased emissions from high-carbon fuel production is oset by increases in emissions
due to low-carbon fuel production. Their work implies that while emissions reduction
is the only way by which rms or producers can comply with the standards, rms can
satisfy the performance-based standards by inating the denominator, thereby leading
to an increase in overall emissions. Their general results are that a performance-based
standard (or intensity standard) cannot attain the rst best, is less ecient with a higher
abatement cost, and could increase emissions. Although their work briey touches upon
the market power in performance-based standards, their main focus remains on situations
with perfect competition. A subsequent work by Holland (2012) compares an emissions
tax with mass- and performance-based standards when incomplete regulation is present,
i.e., a form of market failure. The paper shows that, in the presence of leakage or in-
complete regulation, intensity or performance-based standards can dominate an optimal
carbon tax or C&T due to its implicit output subsidy.
Given this background, our paper contributes to the existing literature and current
policy debates in a number of ways. First, we allow for market power in a performance-
based standards regime to be modeled explicitly and solved in a leader-follower framework
(Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010; Chen and Hobbs, 2005; Chen et al., 2006). Second, also com-
pared to other earlier work (Fischer, 2003a; Tanaka and Chen, 2013), we explicitly consider
the physical system (transmission network along with heterogeneity in technologies and
ownership) that is essential in deciding the substitution of power produced by technolo-
gies with dierent emission intensities when facing environmental policies. Finally, on the
policy side, we directly contribute to the recent policy debates in tradable performance
standards by comparing social surplus under various relevant cases. In particular, we
demonstrate that comparisons between mass- and performance-based standards might
not as straightforward as they seem, and the proceedings from permit auctions under the
mass-based standard need to be accounted for carefully when ranking policy eciency.
3 Qualitative Analysis of Performance-Based Policy
The performance-based policy might provide dierent economic incentives under dier-
ent market structures, thereby leading to dierent market outcomes. Based on stylized
models, we here conduct a qualitative analysis of the performance-based policy bypassing
various institutional, engineering, and market details of power markets, which we will re-
turn to in the next section. We also abstract the analysis without assuming a functional
form of supply or demand curves to derive generalized results. Our focus is to compare
the equilibrium outcome for perfect competition, a Cournot duopoly, and a Stackelberg
duopoly, under a given performance-based policy.
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3.1 Basic Setup
Consider two rms i = 1; 2 with output gi. Let ci(gi) denote the cost function of each
rm. We assume c0i > 0 and c
00
i  0. CO2 emissions rates are either 0 < E1 < F < E2
or E1 > F > E2 > 0, in which F is a regulated emissions rate under performance-based
policy.3 Total CO2 emissions are expressed as e = E1g1 + E2g2. Let p(g) denote inverse
demand function, in which g = g1 + g2. We assume p
0 < 0 and p00  0.
The market-clearing condition for CO2 allowances under the performance-based policy
is generally expressed a complementarity condition as follows:
0  ?F   (E1g1 + E2g2)
g1 + g2
 0; (1)
0  ?(F   E1)g1 + (F   E2)g2  0; (2)
where  is the allowance price. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the market-
clearing condition is binding with a positive price for allowances,  > 0:
(F   E1)g1 + (F   E2)g2 = 0: (3)
We examine the market outcomes under perfect competition, a Cournot duopoly, and a
Stackelberg duopoly in the next three subsections.
3.2 Perfect Competition
We rst consider perfect competition with electricity price, p. The prot-maximization
problem of price-taking rm i is expressed as follows:
Maximize
gi
pgi   ci(gi)  (Ei   F )gi: (4)
The last term, (Ei F )gi, is allowance payment (revenue) for a high- (low-) emitting rm
with Ei > F (Ei < F ). We can derive the rst-order necessary condition for this problem.
Assuming an interior solution together with the market-clearing condition for allowances
(3), the equilibrium conditions for perfect competition are expressed as follows:
p(g)  c0i(gi)  (Ei   F ) = 0; i = 1; 2 (5)
(F   E1)g1 + (F   E2)g2 = 0: (6)
We can solve the three equations simultaneously with respect to the three variables,
g1; g2; , to obtain the equilibrium outcome. First, rearranging Eq. (6) yields g2 = a(g1) =
  (F E1)
F E2 g1. Total output can then be expressed as g = b(g1) =
E1 E2
F E2 g1. Next, Eq. (5)
for i = 2 can be rearranged as follows:
 = f(g1)
=
1
E2   F

p
 
b(g1)
  c02 a(g1): (7)
Finally, substituting b(g1) and f(g1) into Eq. (5) for i = 1 yields:
p
 
b(g1)
  c01(g1)  f(g1)(E1   F ) = 0: (8)
The equilibrium output g1 of rm 1 under perfect competition satises Eq. (8). We
can, thus, characterize the equilibrium outcome for perfect competition using g1, i.e.,
g1; g

2 = a(g

1); g
 = b(g1); 
 = f(g1); p
 = p
 
b(g1)

; e = E1g1 + E2a(g

1)
	
.
3This allows allowance trading to take place.
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3.3 Cournot Duopoly
Under a Cournot duopoly, rms can exert market power on the electricity price but cannot
manipulate the allowance price. The prot-maximization problem of Cournot rm i is
expressed as follows:
Maximize
gi
p(g)gi   ci(gi)  (Ei   F )gi: (9)
Assuming interior solutions and along with the market clearing condition for al-
lowances, the equilibrium conditions for Cournot duopoly are expressed as follows:
p(g) + p0(g)gi   c0i(gi)  (Ei   F ) = 0; i = 1; 2; (10)
(F   E1)g1 + (F   E2)g2 = 0: (11)
As in Section 3.2, the three equations can be solved simultaneously with respect to the
variables g1; g2;  to obtain the equilibrium outcome. Eq. (11) gives the same g2 = a(g1)
and g = b(g1) as before. Eq. (10) for i = 2 can be then rearranged as follows:
 = h(g1)
=
1
E2   F

p
 
b(g1)

+ p0
 
b(g1)

a(g1)  c02
 
a(g1)

: (12)
Substituting b(g1) and h(g1) into Eq. (10) for i = 1 yields:
p
 
b(g1)

+ p0
 
b(g1)

g1   c01(g1)  h(g1)(E1   F ) = 0: (13)
The equilibrium output, gc1, of rm 1 for Cournot duopoly satises Eq. (13). In a similar
way as in perfect competition, we can characterize the equilibrium outcome of Cournot
duopoly, fgci ; gc; c; pc; ecg, accordingly.
3.4 Stackelberg Duopoly
Let rm 1 be the Stackelberg leader, who maximizes its prot anticipating the decision
of the follower rm 2 as well as the market clearing for CO2 allowances. Thus, the leader
rm can exercise market power in both the electricity and allowance markets. The prot-
maximization problem of the leader rm is expressed as follows:
Maximize
g1[fg2;g
p(g)g1   c1(g1)  (E1   F )g1 (14)
s.t. p(g) + p0(g)g2   c02(g2)  (E2   F ) = 0: (15)
(F   E1)g1 + (F   E2)g2 = 0; (16)
As in Section 3.3, we can obtain g2 = a(g1); g = b(g1), and  = h(g1) from Eqs. (15){
(16). Hence, the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, (14){(16), can be
transformed into an unconstrained optimization problem:
Maximize
g1
p
 
b(g1)

g1   c1(g1)  h(g1)(E1   F )g1: (17)
Assuming interior solutions, the rst-order necessary condition for (17) is:
p
 
b(g1)

+ p0
 
b(g1)

b0(g1)g1   c01(g1)  h(g1)(E1   F )  h0(g1)(E1   F )g1 = 0: (18)
The equilibrium output, gs1, of the Stackelberg leader satises Eq. (18). Therefore, we can
characterize the equilibrium outcome for the Stackelberg setting as fgsi ; gs; s; ps; esg.
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3.5 Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes
We now compare the equilibrium outcomes for perfect competition, Cournot duopoly, and
Stackelberg leader-follower settings. More specically, we compare the output, electricity
price, CO2 allowance price, and emissions at equilibrium under dierent market structures
assuming interior solutions. We rst show the result for the output of each rm.
Proposition 3.1. At equilibrium, gsi < g
c
i < g

i holds.
The output of each rm is less under Stackelberg than under Cournot duopoly. It is
worthwhile noting that this proposition holds no matter whether the rm is the leader or
follower in the Stackelberg case. Suppose that the leader rm has a low emissions rate
(i.e., clean). It would be protable for the leader rm to suppress its output because
the allowance price rises by withholding its supply of permits. If the leader rm has a
high emissions rate (i.e., dirty), then it would be again protable for the leader to reduce
his/her output. This is because the allowance price falls by decreasing its demand for
allowances, thereby reducing the burden of allowance payments. Our result is in contrast
to that of a typical Stackelberg duopoly without any environmental regulation in which
the leader rm tends to increase its output relative to that of the follower rm by enjoying
the rst-mover advantage.
We next describe the result for the total output, electricity price, and total CO2
emissions.
Proposition 3.2. At equilibrium, gs < gc < g and ps > pc > p hold.
Proposition 3.3. At equilibrium, es < ec < e holds.
As expected, the total output is the greatest and the electricity price is the lowest under
perfect competition, also accompanied with the greatest CO2 emissions. In contrast, the
total output is the least and the electricity price is the highest under Stackelberg along
with the least CO2 emissions. This result deviates from the typical observation that
Stackelberg outcome lies somewhere between perfect competition and Cournot case when
a allowance market is not considered.
The CO2 allowance prices under Cournot and Stackelberg cases, however, depend on
the emissions intensities of rms.
Proposition 3.4. At equilibrium, the following holds:
If E1 < F < E2; then 
s > c:
If E1 > F > E2; then 
s < c:
This result is related to Proposition 3.1. If the leader rm in Stackelberg duopoly has
a low emissions rate, i.e., E1 < F , then it exerts market power to raise the CO2 allowance
price. In contrast, if the leader rm has a high emissions rate, i.e., E1 > F , then it
suppresses the allowance price. On the other hand, the comparison of the allowance price
between perfect competition and Cournot/Stackelberg settings is ambiguous.
The stylized models herein are helpful in providing general guidance about how rms
might react to a performance-based policy under dierent market structures. However,
in reality, rms might own a set of generating units with various emission intensities, and
output-sale decisions might be aected by transmission constraints. Thus, the analytical
model is extended to account for the physical power system, detailed institutional rules,
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market conditions, and other factors that are known to be crucial to the power sector in
Section 4. Also as alluded to earlier, comparing various scenarios without accounting for
damage costs might be misleading. Thus, our analysis in next section will examine the
results when total emissions are equivalent across cases.
4 Problem Formulation
We use a market-equilibrium approach for a single representative time period that ac-
counts for transmission constraints, nodal pricing, and market power. At each node, we
allow for a number of generating eets that could be owned by dierent companies. These
rms compete in a pool-type power market while subjecting themselves either to a mass-
or a performance-based policy. An independent system operator (ISO) is assumed to
maximize the usage of transmission resources.
We consider ve scenarios in our analysis by varying choices of polices or assumptions
concerning strategic behavior in power and emissions permit markets. In the numerical
examples of Section 5, Scenario (E) is solved rst to obtain the total emissions, which
will be used as an eective emissions cap for the other scenarios: (A) perfect competition
with a mass-based policy, (B) Cournot oligopoly with a mass-based policy, (C) Cournot
oligopoly with a performance-based policy, (D) Stackelberg (leader-follower) oligopoly
with a mass-based policy, and (E) Stackelberg oligopoly with a performance-based policy.
Depending on the market structure, we follow Hobbs (2001) and Chen et al. (2006)
in formulating the problem either as a mixed linear complementarity problem (MLCP)
or a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). If a rm can exercise
market power in the permit market, then a Stackelberg-type leader-follower formulation
is considered in which a leader rm could fully anticipate reactions by follower producers
and the ISO along with the equilibrium for CO2 allowances. In this case, the resulting
bi-level problem may be re-formulated as an MPEC, which is challenging to solve with
currently available commercial solvers because of 1) complementarity conditions of the
lower-level problems and 2) bilinear terms in leader's objective function. We circum-
vent these obstacles by using disjunctive constraints and binary expansion, respectively
(Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010), which enable us to re-cast the problem as a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP). While this transformation might be at the expense of precision
of the solution, the mixed integer algorithm guarantees convergence and enables inferring
the solution quality through the duality gap.
In Sections 4.1{4.4, we primarily show the formulation for Scenario (E), i.e., Stack-
elberg oligopoly with a performance-based policy. As discussed in Section 4.5, we can
obtain Scenario (D), i.e., a Stackelberg oligopoly with a mass-based policy by changing
the environmental regulation. Scenarios (B) and (C), i.e., Cournot oligopoly with either
a mass- or a performance-based policy, can be obtained from the lower-level problem in
Section 4.2 without the upper-level problem in Section 4.3. Furthermore, we can derive
Scenario (A), i.e., perfect competition with a mass-based policy, by assuming that rms
are price-takers instead of Cournot players.
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4.1 Nomenclature
Indices and Sets
 : upper-level decision variables
: lower-level primal decision variables
	: lower-level dual variables
: decision variables for MILP
i 2 I: power producers
s: strategic producer index
j 2 J : non-strategic producers4
k 2 K: discrete generation level
` 2 L: transmission lines
n 2 N : power network nodes
u 2 Un;i: generation units of producer i 2 I at network node n 2 N
Parameters
Bn;n0 : element (n; n
0) of node susceptance matrix, where n; n0 2 N (1=
)
Cn;i;u: generation cost of unit u 2 Un;i from producer i 2 I at node n 2 N ($/MW)
Dintn : intercept of linear inverse demand function at node n 2 N ($/MW)
Dslpn : slope of linear inverse demand function at node n 2 N ($/MW2)
En;i;u: CO2 emissions rate of unit u 2 Un;i from producer i 2 I at node n 2 N (t/MW)
F : regulated CO2 emissions rate under performance (rate)-based policy (t/MW)
F : regulated CO2 emissions cap under mass-based policy (t)
Gn;i;u: maximum generation capacity of unit u 2 Un;i from producer i 2 I at node n 2 N
(MW)
H`;n: element (`; n) of network transfer matrix, where ` 2 L and n 2 N (1=
)
K`: maximum capacity of power line ` 2 L (MW)
Sn 2 f0; 1g: dummy parameter for slack node, where n 2 N ({)
Gn;s;u;k: discrete generation level k 2 K of strategic producer's unit u 2 Un;i located at
node n 2 N (MW)
M;My;M z;M;M; M; M^; ~M;M : large constants used in disjunctive constraints and bi-
nary expansion
Primal Variables
gn;i;u: generation at node n 2 N by producer i 2 I using unit u 2 Un;i (MW)
dn: consumption at node n 2 N (MW)
vn: voltage angle at node n 2 N (rad)
yn;s;u;k: strategic generator's electricity sales revenue at node n 2 N using unit u 2 Un;s
at generation level k 2 K ($)
zn;s;u;k: strategic generator's CO2 permit revenue (or cost) at node n 2 N using unit
u 2 Un;s at generation level k 2 K ($)
qyn;s;u;k: auxiliary variable to linearize the strategic generator's objective function with
respect to electricity sales at node n 2 N using unit u 2 Un;s at generation level k 2 K
qzn;s;u;k: auxiliary variable to linearize the strategic generator's objective function with re-
spect to CO2 permit revenue at node n 2 N using unit u 2 Un;s at generation level k 2 K
4J \ fsg = ;, J [ fsg = I
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Dual Variables
n;i;u: shadow price on generation capacity at node n 2 N for generation unit u 2 Un;i of
producer i 2 I ($/MW)
n: dual for slack node n 2 N ({)
`; `: shadow prices on transmission capacity for transmission line ` 2 L ($/MW)
n: market-clearing price at node n 2 N ($/MW)
: hub price ($/MW)
: shadow price on emissions rate ($/t)
Integer Variables
qn: auxiliary variable used to indicate whether market-clearing price at node n 2 N is
positive
qn;s;u;k: auxiliary variable used to discretize the strategic generator's electricity generation
at node n 2 N using unit u 2 Un;s at generation level k 2 K
rn;j;u: auxiliary variable used to handle the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition with
respect to non-strategic producer j 2 J 's generation at node n 2 N using unit u 2 Un;j
and gn;j;u
rn: auxiliary variable used to handle the KKT condition with respect to consumption at
node n 2 N and dn
rn;j;u: auxiliary variable used to handle complementarity condition between generation
constraint of non-strategic producer j 2 J 's unit u 2 Un;j located at node n 2 N and
shadow price of generation capacity
r^`: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between transmission
line `'s capacity constraint and the shadow price in positive direction
~r`: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between transmission
line `'s capacity constraint and the shadow price in negative direction
r: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between the emissions
constraint and the CO2 price
Using the denition of voltage angles, the power ow on line ` is
P
n2N H`;nvn and the
imported power at node n is  Pn02N Bn;n0vn0 .
4.2 Lower-Level Problem Formulated as MLCP
We here describe the lower-level problems for follower rms and the ISO along with a
market-clearing condition for CO2 allowances.
Follower rms' problem: Follower rms maximize their prots under the performance-
based policy as in Eq. (19). Those rms can aect the power price through their generation
output a la Cournot, while they take other variables as given.
Maximize
gn;j;u0;n
X
n2N
X
u2Un;j
 
n  

Cn;j;u +  (En;j;u   F )
!
gn;j;u (19)
s.t. n = D
int
n  Dslpn
 X
i2I
X
u02Un;i
gn;i;u0  
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0
!
;8n (20)
gn;j;u  Gn;j;u (n;j;u); 8n;8u 2 Un;j (21)
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where
P
n2N
P
u2Un;j  (En;j;u   F ) gn;j;u in Eq. (19) represents CO2 allowance payment
(revenue) if its value is positive (negative). Eq. (20) relates the electricity price to the
inverse demand function at each node n. Eq. (21) is the generation capacity constraint.
By substituting Eq. (20) into the objective function, we can rearrange the above problem
as follows:
Maximize
gn;j;u0
X
n2N
X
u2Un;j
24Dintn  Dslpn
 X
i2I
X
u02Un;i
gn;i;u0  
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0
!
 
 
Cn;j;u +  (En;j;u   F )
!#
gn;j;u (22)
s.t. gn;j;u  Gn;j;u (n;j;u); 8n;8u 2 Un;j (23)
ISO's problem: The ISO maximizes social welfare in Eq. (24) as in Gabriel and Leuthold
(2010) and Tanaka (2009) taking the strategic output of generating rms as given:
Maximize
dn0;vn
X
n2N

Dintn dn  
1
2
Dslpn d
2
n  
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
Cn;i;ugn;i;u

(24)
s.t.
X
n2N
H`;nvn  K` (`); 8` (25)
 
X
n2N
H`;nvn  K` (`); 8` (26)
Sn vn = 0 (n); 8n (27)
dn  
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
gn;i;u +
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0 = 0 (n); 8n (28)X
n2N
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0 = 0 () (29)
Our formulation is based on a standard DC load-ow model, which uses the network
transfer matrix H and the susceptance matrix B with the voltage angle v (Schweppe
et al., 1988; Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010). Eqs. (25){(26) represent the transmission
capacity constraints, while Eq. (27) denes a slack bus. Eq. (28) corresponds to the
energy-balance constraint at each node, while Eq. (29) is the total energy balance over
all nodes to ensure that total generation matches total demand in the system, i.e., the
imported power is netted out over all nodes.
Market-clearing condition for CO2 allowances: Under the performance-based pol-
icy, the equilibrium for CO2 allowances is expressed as a complementarity condition as
follows:
0   ?
X
n2N
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
(F   En;i;u) gn;i;u  0 (30)
If the right-hand side of Eq. (30) is not binding, i.e., total CO2 allowances,
P
n2N
P
i2I
P
u2Un;i Fgn;i;u,
are greater than their demand,
P
n2N
P
i2I
P
u2Un;i En;i;ugn;i;u, then the allowance price,
, is 0. Otherwise, we have a positive allowance price, i.e.,  > 0.
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We then derive the KKT conditions for the above problems. The lower-level problems
are formulated as an MLCP as follows.
0  gn;j;u ? Dslpn
X
u02Un;j
gn;j;u0 + Cn;j;u + n;j;u   n +  (En;j;u   F )  0;8n;8j; 8u 2 Un;j
(31)
0  dn ?  Dintn +Dslpn dn + n  0;8n (32)X
`2L
`H`;n  
X
`2L

`
H`;n + nSn  
X
n02N
(n0   )Bn0;n = 0 with vn u.r.s.;8n (33)
0  n;j;u ? Gn;j;u   gn;j;u  0; 8n;8j; 8u 2 Un;j (34)
0  ` ? K`  
X
n2N
H`;nvn  0 ; 8` (35)
0  
`
? K` +
X
n2N
H`;nvn  0 ; 8` (36)
Snvn = 0 with n u.r.s.; 8n (37)
dn  
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
gn;i;u +
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0 = 0 with n u.r.s.; 8n (38)X
n2N
X
n02N
Bn;n0vn0 = 0 with  u.r.s. (39)
0   ?
X
n2N
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
(F   En;i;u) gn;i;u  0 (40)
4.3 Upper-Level Problem and MPEC Formulation
A Stackelberg leader rm maximizes its prot subject to the lower-level problems in
Section 4.2. Since all the lower-level problems in Section 4.2 are convex, they may be
replaced by their KKT conditions in the leader's problem. Thus, we can recast the
leader's problem as an MPEC by using the lower-level MLCP in Eqs. (31){(40):
Maximize
 [[	
X
n2N
X
u2Un;s
 
n  

Cn;s;u +  (En;s;u   F )
!
gn;s;u (41)
s.t. gn;s;u  Gn;s;u (n;s;u); 8n;8u 2 Un;s (42)
Eqs. (31){(40)
where   = fgn;s;u  0g,  = fgn;j;u  0; dn  0; vng, and 	 = fn;j;u  0; `  0; ` 
0; n; n; ;   0g.
4.4 MILP Reformulation
The complementarity conditions in Eqs. (31){(32), (34){(36), and (40) can be converted
to disjunctive constraints using suciently large constants (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl,
1981; Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010). Another computational diculty is the bilinear terms,
ngn;s;u and  (En;s;u   F ) gn;s;u in Eq. (41). We apply binary expansion to linearize
those bilinear terms (Barroso et al., 2006; Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010). Taking discrete
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generation level k of strategic producer's unit u 2 Un;i located at node n 2 N , i.e., Gn;s;u;k,
we consider the following linearization.
yn;s;u;k =

nGn;s;u;k if qn;s;u;k = q

n = 1
0 otherwise
(43)
zn;s;u;k =
   (En;s;u   F )Gn;s;u;k if qn;s;u;k = r = 1
0 otherwise
(44)
If generation level Gn;s;u;k is selected and power price n is positive, then we have the
strategic generator's electricity sales revenue, yn;s;u;k. Moreover, if generation level Gn;s;u;k
is selected and the CO2 allowance price  is positive, then we have strategic generator's
CO2 permit revenue (or cost), zn;s;u;k. Our formulation is an extension of Gabriel and
Leuthold (2010) in which one type of bilinear term was considered.
Maximize

X
n2N
X
u2Un;s
 X
k2K
yn;s;u;k+
X
k2K
zn;s;u;k   Cn;s;ugn;s;u
!
(45)
s.t. (33); (37); (38); (39)
0  n Mqn; 8n (46)
gn;s;u =
X
k2K
qn;s;u;kGn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s (47)X
k2K
qn;s;u;k = 1; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s (48)
qyn;s;u;k  qn; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (49)
qyn;s;u;k  qn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (50)
qn;s;u;k + q

n   1  qyn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (51)
yn;s;u;k  nGn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (52)
0  yn;s;u;k Myqyn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (53)
qzn;s;u;k  r; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (54)
qzn;s;u;k  qn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (55)
qn;s;u;k + r   1  qzn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (56)
zn;s;u;k    (En;s;u   F )Gn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (57)
0  zn;s;u;k M zqzn;s;u;k; 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k (58)
0   Dintn +Dslpn dn + n Mrn; 8n (59)
0  dn M (1  rn) ; 8n (60)
0  Dslpn
X
u02Un;j
gn;j;u0 + Cn;j;u   n + n;j;u Mrn;j;u; 8n; j; u 2 Un;j (61)
0  gn;j;u M (1  rn;j;u) ; 8n; j; u 2 Un;j (62)
0  K`  
X
n
H`;nvn  M^ r^`; 8` (63)
0  `  M^ (1  r^`) ; 8` (64)
0  K` +
X
n
H`;nvn  ~M ~r`; 8` (65)
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0  
`
 ~M (1  ~r`) ; 8` (66)
0   gn;j;u +Gn;j;u  M rn;j;u; 8n; j; u 2 Un;j (67)
0  n;j;u  M (1  rn;j;u) ; 8n; j; u 2 Un;j (68)
0 
X
n2N
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
(F   En;i;u) gn;i;u M(1  r) (69)
0   Mr (70)
r 2 f0; 1g; rn 2 f0; 1g; 8n; rn;j;u 2 f0; 1g; rn;j;u 2 f0; 1g; 8n; j; u 2 Un;j;
r^` 2 f0; 1g; ~r` 2 f0; 1g 8` (71)
qn 2 f0; 1g 8n; qn;s;u;k 2 f0; 1g; qyn;s;u;k 2 [0; 1] ; qzn;s;u;k 2 [0; 1] 8n; 8u 2 Un;s; 8k
(72)
where we dene:
 = fdn; gn;i;u; vn; n; ; `; `; n;j;u; n; ; r; rn; rn;j;u; rn;j;u; r^`; ~r`; yn;s;u;k; qn;s;u;k; qn; q
y
n;s;u;k; q
z
n;s;u;kg.
4.5 Other Formulations
We briey discuss other formulations in Scenarios (A){(D). In Scenario (D), i.e., Stack-
elberg oligopoly with mass-based policy, the objective functions of the leader rm in Eq.
(41) and the follower rms in Eq. (19) are respectively modied as follows:
Maximize
 [[	
X
n2N
X
u2Un;s
(n   Cn;s;u) gn;s;u   
X
n2N
X
u2Un;s
En;s;ugn;s;u (73)
Maximize
gn;j;u0;n
X
n2N
X
u2Un;j
(n   Cn;j;u) gn;j;u   
X
n2N
X
u2Un;j
En;j;ugn;j;u (74)
The market-clearing condition for CO2 allowances in Eq. (30) is also modied as follows:
0   ? F  
X
n2N
X
i2I
X
u2Un;i
En;i;ugn;i;u  0 (75)
Scenarios (B) and (C), i.e., Cournot oligopolies with mass- and performance-based
policies, respectively, can be obtained from the lower-level problem of the follower rms
without the upper-level problem for the leader rm. Furthermore, we can derive Scenario
(A), i.e., perfect competition with mass-based policy by assuming that rms are price-
takers instead of price-makers. This can be implemented by removing Eq. (20) and
maximizing Eq. (74) with respect to only gn;j;u.
5 Numerical Examples
A simple three-node network with three rms, ten generating units, and three transmission
lines is used to analyze welfare outcomes under various emission policies. This setup is
suciently generalized as it allows rms to own facilities and to compete across dierent
locations. The information concerning demand is in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes the
characteristics of those ten generating units, including their location, ownership, marginal
cost, emission rate, and generating capacity. These parameters are obtained by solving a
cost-minimization problem while subjecting each location to a xed demand. The ows
in the network are governed by Kirchho's laws with the information on thermal limits
given in Table 3.
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Table 1: Demand parameters
Location Vertical intercept Horizontal intercept
[$/MWh] [MW]
A 228.00 1400
B 93.12 540
C 111.60 840
Table 2: Characteristics of generating units
Unit Owner Location Marginal cost Emission rate Capacity
[$/MWh] [ton/MWh] [MW]
1 3 A 38.00 0.580 250
2 1 A 35.72 0.545 200
3 2 A 36.80 0.600 450
4 1 B 15.52 0.500 150
5 2 B 16.20 0.500 200
6 3 B 0.00 0.000 200
7 1 C 17.60 1.216 400
8 1 C 16.64 1.249 400
9 1 C 19.40 1.171 450
10 3 C 18.60 0.924 200
Table 3: Transmission data
Lines Thermal limit
[MW]
AB 255
BC 120
AC 30
5.1 Policy Scenarios
We consider ve scenarios in the analysis depending on the type of regulation, i.e., trad-
able mass-based or performance-based standard, and whether rms possess market power
in either (both) the product or (and) tradable permit markets. We assume that a per-
formance standard of 0.5 ton/MWh is implemented by a regulatory agency. This level of
the emission rate is chosen such that some generating units will be either above or below
the standard.
The starting point is a tradable performance-based standard with the leader-follower
(or Stackelberg-type) market structure (Scenario E). This serves as a benchmark as its
resulting total CO2 emissions will be used as the emission cap in other scenarios. In eect,
we are interested in comparing market outcomes as well as welfare when the damage
caused by the emitted pollution is equivalent across scenarios. Had the damage caused
by pollution varied by dierent scenarios, the welfare ranking of the scenarios could be
misleading. The remaining four scenarios include a Stackelberg mass-based standard
(Scenario D), an oligopoly mass- and a performance-based standard (Scenarios B and
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C, respectively), i.e., rms possess market power only in the product market and not in
the tradable permit market, and the nal scenario is a mass-based standard with perfect
competition in both the product and permit market (Scenario A). While Scenarios D and
E are MPECs (and, thus, require reformulation as MILPs as discussed in Section 4.4),
Scenarios B and C are MLCPs, which can be directly tackled by the PATH solver. Finally,
Scenario A can be represented as either a quadratic program or an MLCP. One note on
solving Scenario C is that we iterate over the performance-based standard until the total
emissions are equivalent to those under Scenario E. For the other scenarios, we directly
impose the emission cap obtained from Scenario E.
5.2 Results
This section reports the main outcomes of our analyses. All the results are based on the
models presented as in Section 4, which is implemented in the modeling system AMPL and
is solved via either CPLEX (for MILPs) or PATH (for MLCPs). The problem instances
are executed on a MacBook Pro running OS X 10.7.5 with 8 GB of RAM and take about
ten minutes to solve to optimality in the case of MILPs. The main results are discussed
in Section 5.2.1 followed by a sensitivity analysis as well as rm-level results in Sections
5.2.2 and 5.2.3, respectively.
5.2.1 Base Case
Table 4 summarizes the main results of the analysis. The columns from left to right corre-
spond to Scenarios A{E, respectively. The table comprises two parts, in which the upper
panel gives the aggregated market outcomes (i.e., sale-weighted prices, permit price, total
emissions, consumer surplus, producer surplus, ISO revenue, arbitrageur prot, govern-
ment revenue, social surplus, and total power sales), and the lower panel details producer
surplus by rms as well as locational prices and sales. It is worth noting that when cal-
culating government revenue under the mass-based standards, we explicitly assume that
the permits are auctioned o so that the revenue is equal to the product of the permit
price and the total emissions (= emission cap).
Several observations emerge from Table 4 regarding the overall market-level outcomes.
First, the sale-weighted power prices are lower among performance-based scenarios (C and
E) compared to their counterparts. For example, the sale-weighted power price under
Scenario E is 7.5% (or $6.5/MWh) lower than that of Scenario D. This is directly due
to the cross-subsidy under the performance-based standard that eectively lowers the
marginal cost of high-cost but low-emitting units. Consequently, total power sales under
the performance-based scenarios are generally higher when compared to those under their
mass-based counterparts. Second, although with equal CO2 emissions of 663.9 tons, the
resulting permit prices under the performance-based scenarios, i.e., C and E, are greater
than those in Scenarios B and D, respectively. The cross-subsidy eect of the performance-
based standard lowers power prices, inates power sales, and elevates demand for tradable
permits, thereby leading to an increase in the permit price. Comparing these scenarios,
permit prices under the performance-based policies are two to three times higher than
those under the mass-based standards. Finally, lower output and higher prices under the
Stackelberg setting vis-a-vis the Cournot one are also established in Proposition 3.2.
Turning to welfare analysis, consistent with theory, perfect competition (Scenario A)
leads to the highest social surplus. Due to the cross-subsidy by the performance-based
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Table 4: Summary of results under the relatively dirty endowment
Scenario
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Sale-weighted price [$/MWh] 76.6 81.3 70.8 85.7 79.2
Permit price [$/ton] 73.2 40.9 109.7 39.4 120.7
Total CO2 emissions [tons] 663.9 663.9 663.9 663.9 663.9
Consumer surplus [$] 73,745.5 68,733.8 79,775.4 61,897.0 69,251.9
Producer surplus [$] 11,547.2 39,396.5 51,960.8 43,949.4 61,949.4
ISO revenue [$] 8,034.0 6,187.1 9,758.5 8,589.2 10,486.6
Arbitrageur prot [$] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government revenue [$] 48,588.1 27,160.4 0.0 26,170.1 0.0
Social welfare [$] 141,914.8 141,477.8 141,494.7 140,605.8 141,687.9
Net producer surplus [$] 60,135.3 66,556.9 51,960.8 70,119.5 61,949.4
Total sales [MWh] 1,329.3 1,293.6 1,362.2 1,280.5 1,327.9
Producer surplus [$]
1 1123.0 9317.8 10,831.5 11,190.6 14,115.4
2 0.0 11,615.9 13,484.6 10,409.5 14,962.0
3 10,424.2 18,462.8 27,644.7 22,349.3 32,872.0
Price [$/MWh]
A 80.7 85.8 75.3 95.8 87.5
B 52.8 61.1 44.8 57.6 47.8
C 86.2 80.4 92.4 76.7 84.7
Consumption [MW]
A 904.4 873.3 937.9 811.7 862.4
B 233.9 185.8 280.0 205.9 263.0
C 191.0 234.5 144.3 262.9 202.4
standards, the lower power prices also result in higher consumer surplus when compar-
ing Scenarios E and C to D and B, respectively. Moreover, while the theory suggests
that market outcomes under the leader-follower Stackelberg setting will lie somewhere in
between that of perfect competition and less competitive Cournot outcomes, our results
actually deviate from that ordering (Tirole, 1988; Gibbons, 1992). This is mainly because
the higher permit price under the leader-follower Scenario E somehow osets its benecial
eects, thereby leading to lower consumer surplus by 6.7% compared to Scenario C.
While the performance-based standard is essentially revenue neutral due to cross-
subsidy by default, this is not necessarily the case for the mass-based standard; rather,
it depends on how the proceeds from permit auctions are distributed among the enti-
ties. Thus, directly contrasting producer surplus between performance- and mass-based
standards could actually be misleading. In our analysis, when the proceeds from the
permit auctions under the mass-based standard are returned to the producers, producer
surplus under the mass-based standard will outperform that of the performance-based
standards.5 Otherwise, producer surplus will be lower under the mass-based standards as
the economic rent from tradable permits is retained by the government.
5To see this, we compute the net producer surplus assuming that economic rent from the mass-based
permits is retained by the producers.
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Turning to the ISO's revenue, to our surprise, we nd that it is consistently higher
under the performance-based standards (Scenarios C and E) by a sizable margin (25%-
60%), suggesting that cross-subsidy might lead to more congestion. However, this causal
relationship might be speculative at this moment, and further analyses will be needed to
disentangle the eect. Finally, when summing over the economic rent to calculate the
social welfare, performance-based standards perform better under the Stackelberg setting
compared to the mass-based policy. This implies that exertion of market power under
the performance-based standard could mitigate some of the market distortion caused by
rms' strategic behavior in the product markets.
Focusing on locational outcomes, a comparison of Scenarios C and E in the bottom
panel of Table 4 indicates that exercise of market power in the permit market under the
performance-based standard by rm 1 (the leader) enables it to earn considerably more
prot ($14,115-$10,831=$3,284) or 30% higher. Likewise, Scenarios D and E suggest that
the leader (rm 1) under the performance standard could earn 26% higher prot ($14,115-
$11,090=$3,025) than that of the mass-based standard. Concerning power prices, Table
4 also implies that under the performance-based standards (Scenarios C and E), there is
a signicant increase in power price dierences among nodes. This also reects on the
increases in the ISO's revenue as alluded to earlier.
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: a Leader with a Relatively Clean Endowment
One possible threat to our general conclusion in Section 5.2.1 is that the rms' incentives to
manipulate the permit market are associated with the characteristics of their endowment,
i.e., whether a leader's generating asset is clean or dirty relative to the performance
standard. We investigate this conjecture by reducing the emission rate of unit 7 owned by
the leader (rm 1) from 1.216 to 0.216 tons/MWh. This deliberate manipulation of the
emission rate is intended to create an environment that would be in favor of the leader to
manipulate the permit market. Table 5 summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis
with the same layout as Table 4.
We bypass discussing the conclusions that are similar to those in Table 4 and focus
on those that are dierent. First, lowering the emission rate of unit 7 directly suppresses
the demand for permits and reduces permit prices across all scenarios. The permit price
under Scenario D (Stackelberg leader-follower setting with the mass-based standard) even
crashes to zero, meaning that Scenario D's total emissions (830.6 tons) are below the cap
set by Scenario E (833.7 tons).6 This observation suggests that a mass-based standard
might be less susceptible than the performance-based standard to the manipulation of the
permit market by the leader. Second, consumers would benet from lower permit as well
as lower power prices. Third, the rank of the social welfare between Scenarios B and E
is reversed in contrast to Table 4. In particular, the ination of power consumption due
to the cross-subsidy under the performance-based standard (E) creates permit scarcity
that would enable rm 1 (now with a relatively clean portfolio) to manipulate the mar-
ket. This implies that in Table 4, the cross-subsidy eect on the power price dominates
the market power eect, thereby resulting in a higher social welfare in Scenario E. The
6Had the leader of the market been allowed to \withhold" the permits, the company would likely
withhold some permits and push the permit price above zero (Chen et al., 2006). Allowing for withholding
the permits will undoubtedly enhance the market power of the leader. However, considering this under
the current MILP reformulation is challenging as it would require discretizing the product of the permit
price and withholding quantity. While the former is endogenously determined by the model, the latter
variable could in principle be bounded by a rather large number.
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Table 5: Summary of results under the relatively clean endowment
Scenario
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Sale-weighted price [$/MWh] 40.8 58.8 58.5 62.3 65.1
Permit price [$/ton] 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 19.8
Total CO2 emissions [tons] 833.7 833.7 833.7 830.6 833.7
Consumer surplus [$] 131,963.0 100,706.0 101,286.0 92,313.0 88,501.2
Producer surplus [$] 30,578.7 55,038.1 55,424.8 61,382.5 63,312.7
ISO revenue [$] 1,604.7 3,869.9 3,869.9 5,169.8 5,844.8
Arbitrageur prot [$] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government revenue [$] 2,134.5 774.8 0.0 2,135.0 0.0
Social welfare [$] 16,6281.0 160,388.7 160,058.7 161,000.3 157,658.7
Net producer surplus [$] 32,713.2 55,812.9 55,424.8 63,517.5 63,312.7
Total sales [MWh] 2,071.5 1,733.9 1,740.4 1,715.0 1,667.4
Producer surplus [$]
1 7,480.8 18,153.4 18,285.4 20,438.6 21,868.9
2 11,760.8 17,432.4 17,562.3 17,827.2 17,295
3 11,337.1 19,452.3 19,577.1 23,116.7 24,148.8
Price [$/MWh]
A 55.5 67.3 66.9 81.1 82.1
B 37.7 46.6 46.2 47.8 47.8
C 19.8 48.2 47.9 38.5 44.1
Consumption [MW]
A 1059.2 986.9 988.9 902.0 895.9
B 321.6 269.8 271.7 263.0 263.0
C 690.7 477.2 479.7 550.0 508.4
reverse relationship is prevalent in Table 5 because the market can maintain the permit
price (compared to a zero permit price in mass-based standard in D and a marginally
positive permit price in B and C) to the extent such that the power price remains higher
under Scenario E than that of B, thereby leading to a lower social welfare. Another way
to understand this is to compare producer surplus when the proceedings from the permit
auctions are entitled to the producers. As alluded to in Table 5, this net producer sur-
plus under Scenario E ($63,312.7) is greater than that in Scenario B ($55,812.9), which
suggests an economic advantage for the leader when its asset is relatively clean under the
performance-based standard.
5.2.3 Firm-Level Outcomes
Table 6 reports output by generating units under the baseline or relatively dirty (left)
and clean (right) endowment, respectively. Outcomes are also grouped vertically by three
sections, corresponding to units owned by the three rms: rm 1 (2, 4, 7, 8, and 9), rm
2 (3 and 5), and rm 3 (1, 6, and 10).
The output is aected by a number of factors, including types of regulation (mass- or
performance-based standards), competition or market structure, and endowment (dirty or
clean), through changes in the permit and power prices. The higher permit prices under
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the relatively dirty endowment cases reduce rms' operations of relatively dirty units, 7,
8, and 9. In particular, among the ve scenarios, units 7 and 8 are completely shut down
while the unit 10 operates at only 5% of its capacity under Scenario D (or 10 MW).
One way to study the impacts of mass- and performance-based policies is to compare
the changes in output while holding the market structure unchanged, i.e., comparing
Scenarios C vs. B and Scenarios E vs. D, respectively. Those are marked in Table 6 as
4CB and4ED by subtracting B and D from C and E, respectively. Overall, moving from
a mass-based to a performance-based standard has a direct impact on those units whose
emission rate is modestly higher than the policy rate of 0.5 tons/MWh. For a generating
unit whose emission rate is greater than the policy rate under the performance-based
standard, the amount of emission cost that needs to pay is in proportion to the dierence
of its emission rate relative to the policy rate, which is equal to (E Epolicy)CO2performance.
In contrast, a unit's emission cost under a mass-based standard is the product of its
emission rate and the permit price, E CO2mass. While the term E Epolicy is smaller than
E, CO2performance is typically greater than ECO2mass. Overall, the impact on rms' operation
decisions also depends on the power prices. On the one hand, a lower power price under the
performance-based standard would likely make it economically less desirable to produce
even when the incurred emission cost, (E   Epolicy) CO2performance, is relatively low. This
is the case under the \dirty" scenario as the output by the units 3 and 10 is reduced by
62 and 90 MW, respectively. On the other hand, however, when the two Scenarios, C and
B, experience compatible power prices under the relatively \clean" case, it could actually
encourage output production from units 3 and 10 under the performance-based standard.
Consequently, their outputs increase by 23 and 1 MW, respectively.
A similar observation also emerges if comparing Scenarios E and D for units owned
by rms 2 and 3 when the power prices are signicant lower under the performance-
based case than the mass-based case. For instance, unit 10 owned by rm 3 cuts its
output by 51 and 21.6 MW, respectively, under the relatively dirty and clean scenarios,
respectively. One interesting result is that under the relatively clean scenario, the leader
(rm 1) suppresses the output from a relatively clean source, unit 7 (0.216 tons/MWh)
under the performance-based standard in order to push the permit price to $19.8/ton
from zero in the mass-based standard.7 The higher permit price under a Stackelberg
setting as opposed to a Cournot one is also consistent with Proposition 3.4. This strategy
is more eective under the performance-based rather than the mass-based standards as
the permit price crashes to zero in the latter case. Furthermore, a comparison between
relatively dirty and clean scenarios shows that the lower permit price under the relatively
clean case provides economic incentives for relatively dirty units, which otherwise will be
shut down or produce less under the relatively dirty scenario, to produce more.
6 Conclusions
Considerable exibility is given by the US Environmental Protection Agency to each
state to achieve the state-specic performance standard under the federal CPP. Con-
ventional wisdom believes there are two sets of tools available on the table: a tradable
performance-based and a mass-based permit program. While both approaches intend to
harness economic eciency through trading either mass-based or performance-based cred-
its, fundamentally these two types of programs are dierent in a number of ways. First,
7Such a cost-squeezing strategy is also reported elsewhere (Chen and Hobbs, 2005; Chen et al., 2006).
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Table 6: Output by generating units under the relative dirty (left) and clean (right)
scenarios
Relatively Dirty Scenarios Relatively Clean Scenarios
Unit (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 4CB 4ED (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 4CB 4ED
2 200 200 200 200 200 0 0 200 200 200 200 200 0 0
4 150 150 150 150 150 0 0 150 150 150 150 150 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 0 225 270 220 225 -50
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 40 70 19 30
9 0 0 0 10 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 274 370 308 217 237 -62 20 218 370 393 272 266 23 -6
5 154 106 200 126 183 94 57 109 106 192 183 183 86 0
1 250 124 250 215 245 126 30 250 124 216 250 250 92 0
6 200 200 200 200 200 0 0 200 200 200 200 200 0 0
10 101 144 54 163 112 -90 -51 0 144 146 150 128 1 -22
the tradable performance-based standard is essentially revenue neutral as it involves a
cross-subsidy from relatively high-emitting generators to relatively low-emitting genera-
tors. The standard eectively lowers the marginal cost of low-emitting generators through
awarded tradable permits. On the other hand, the tradable mass-based standard increases
the marginal cost of all generators in proportion to their emission rates. Depending on
how the program is designed, the sizable economic rent associated with tradable permits
under the mass-based standard (by auctions for example) can be re-distributed either
to producers, consumers, or retained by the government for other purposes. The cross-
subsidy under the performance-based standard would eectively subsidize low-emitting
units, which are more likely at margin. This, in turn, will lower power prices, thereby
encouraging more consumption as well as enhancing permit demand.
This paper studies the impact of the mass- and performance-based standard under
imperfect competition either in the product market only or in both the product and the
permit markets. A stylized analytical model is developed to produce generalized conclu-
sions, and a simulation-based model is used to evaluate policy eciency while subjecting
each scenario to a same level of total CO2 emissions. For numerical simulations, depend-
ing on market structure, we follow Hobbs (2001) and Chen et al. (2006) in formulating the
problem either as an MLCP or an MPEC. Our analysis shows that the market equilibrium
is determined not only by the types of the standards, i.e., mass- or performance-based, but
also by market structure as well as the asset endowment of the leader. While a Stackel-
berg rm might be more capable of manipulating the market under the performance-based
standard, the impact on the power market is somehow attenuated by the cross-subsidy
from high-emitting to low-emitting units through a lowering of the power prices. Interest-
ingly, we nd that when the endowment of the Stackelberg leader is relatively dirty, the
performance-based standard can outperform the mass-based standard as the cross-subsidy
leads to higher consumption and scarcer permits. Consequently, the leader's incentive to
behave strategically in both product and permits markets is mitigated due to the higher
permit price. On the other hand, when the endowment of the Stackelberg leader is rel-
atively clean, the leader will act more aggressively to extract economic rent under the
performance-based standard, thereby worsening market outcomes when compared to the
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counterpart mass-based standards. This is partially due to the fact that the lower permit
price when the leader is relatively clean cannot lower the power price adequately to benet
consumers.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature and current policy debates in a number
of ways. First, we extend the previous work to allow for market power in a performance-
based standard to be modeled explicitly and solved in a leader-follower framework. Sec-
ond, also compared to other earlier work, we explicitly consider the physical transmission
system that is essential in deciding substitution of power generation from technologies
with dierent emission intensities when facing performance-based standards. Finally, on
the policy side, we directly contribute to recent policy debates on tradable performance
standards by comparing welfare under various relevant scenarios.
However, there are a number of unresolved issues that are also important in un-
derstanding the performance-based standard and deserve further attention. First, we
limit our attention to a situation in which the market is subject to a single or uniform
performance-based standard. In reality, a regional interconnected power market is com-
posed of many states, and each could have a dierent policy type (i.e., performance-based
or mass-based standard) or with a dierent rate requirement. Second, our analysis seem-
ingly suggests that a performance-based standard might interact with the transmission
network in a way that creates a greater spatial price divergence, thereby leading to a
more congested network. Whether this observation is robust to dierent network topolo-
gies remains an open question and deserves further investigation. Overall, our analysis
indicates that under some circumstances, a performance-based standard might be more
vulnerable to imperfect competition. Its impact might be to some extent softened by the
lower power prices due to cross-subsidy eects. Even with that, a regulatory agency still
needs to be cautious when implementing these policies as the permits represent a sizable
economic rent. Any transfer of this economic rent among entities under dierent types
of standards will have signicant distributional implications. Finally, we leave considera-
tions concerning the aforementioned unresolved issues in a larger test network (Ruiz and
Conejo, 2009) to future research.
Acknowledgments
Chen was supported by the University of California Santa Cruz New Faculty Research
Grant (NFRG) program. Tanaka was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science (JSPS) KAKENHI (no. 26380291). We are also grateful for the funding support
provided by JSPS KAKENHI (no. 15H02975). Any remaining errors are the authors'
own.
References
Barroso, L.A., R.D. Carneiro, S. Granville, M.V. Pereira, and M.H.C. Fampa (2006),
\Nash Equilibrium in Strategic Bidding: a Binary Expansion Approach," IEEE Trans-
actions on Power Systems 21(2): 629{638.
Burtraw, D., K. Palmer, A. Paul, and S. Pan (2015), \A Proximate Mirror: Greenhouse
Gas Rules and Strategic Behavior Under the US Clean Air Act," Environmental and
Resource Economics 62: 217{241.
24
Bushnell, J., S.P. Holland, J. Hughes, and C.R. Knittel (2014), \Strategic Policy Choice in
State-Level Regulation: the EPA's Clean Power Plan," University of California Energy
Institute Working Paper 255, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Chen, Y. and B.F. Hobbs (2005), \An Oligopolistic Power Market Model with Tradable
NOx Permits," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 20(1): 119{129.
Chen, Y., B.F. Hobbs, S. Leyer, and T. Munson (2006), \Solution of Large-Scale Leader-
Follower Market Equilibria Problems: Electric Power and NOx Permit Markets," Com-
putational Management Science 3(4): 307{330.
Chen, Y. and C-L. Tseng (2011), \Inducing Clean Technology in the Electricity Sector:
Tradable Permits or Carbon Tax Policies?" The Energy Journal 32(3): 149-174.
Fischer, C. (2003a), \Combining Performance-Based and Cap-and-Trade Emissions Poli-
cies," Climate Policy 3(S2):S89{S103.
Fischer, C. (2003b), \Output-Based Allocation of Environmental Policy Revenues and
Imperfect Competition," RFF Discussion Paper 02-60-2003, Washington, DC, USA.
Fortuny-Amat, J. and B. McCarl (1981), \A Representation and Economic Interpreta-
tion of a Two-Level Programming Problem," The Journal of the Operational Research
Society 32(9): 783{792.
Gabriel, S. A. and F.U. Leuthold (2010), \Solving Discretely-Constrained MPEC Prob-
lems with Applications in Electric Power Markets," Energy Economics 32: 3{14.
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, USA.
Green, R. (2008), \Carbon Tax and Carbon Permits: The Impact on Generators' Risks,"
The Energy Journal 29(3): 67{90.
Hahn, R. W. (1984), \Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 99(4): 753{765.
Hobbs, B.F. (2001), \Linear Complementarity Models of Nash-Cournot Competition in
Bilateral and POOLCO Power Markets," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 16(2):
194{202.
Holland, S. P. (2012), \Emissions Taxes versus Intensity Standards: Second-Best Envi-
ronmental Policies with Incomplete Regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 63(3): 375{387.
Holland, S.P., J.E. Hughes, and C.R. Knittel (2009), \Greenhouse Gas Reductions under
Low Carbon Fuel Standards?" American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1(1):
106{46.
Mansur, E. (2013), \Prices versus Quantities: Environmental Regulation and Imperfect
Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics 44(1): 80{102.
Misiolek, W. and H. Elder (1989), \Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for Pollution
Rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16: 156{166.
25
Parry, I.W.H., L.H. Goulder, and D. Burtraw (1997), "Revenue-Raising vs. Other Ap-
proaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Signicance of Existing Tax Dis-
tortion," Rand Journal of Economics 28(4): 708{731.
Ruiz, C. and A.J. Conejo (2009), \Pool Strategy of a Producer With Endogenous For-
mation of Locational Marginal Prices," IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 24(4):
1855{1866.
Sartzetakis, E. (1997), \Raising Rivals' Costs Strategies via Emission Permits Markets,"
Review of Industrial Organization 12: 751{765.
Schweppe, F.C., M.C. Carmanis, R.D. Tabors, and R.E. Bohn (1988), Spot Pricing of
Electricity, Kluwer Academic, Boston, MA, USA.
Siddiqui, A.S., M. Tanaka, and Y. Chen (2016), \Are Targets for Renewable Portfolio
Standards Too Low? The Impact of Market Structure on Energy Policy," European
Journal of Operational Research 250(1): 328{351.
Stavins, R.N. (1995), \Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits," Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management 29: 133{147.
Tanaka, M. (2009), \Transmission-Constrained Oligopoly in the Japanese Electricity Mar-
ket," Energy Economics 31(5): 690{701.
Tanaka, M. and Y. Chen (2013), \Market Power in Renewable Portfolio Standards,"
Energy Economics 39: 187{196.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, USA.
von der Fehr, N.-H. (1993), \Tradable Emission Rights and Strategic Interaction," Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics 3: 129{151.
Weitzman, M.L. (1974), \Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economics Studies 41(4):
477{491.
Zhang D., Y. Chen, and M. Tanaka (2016), \Analysis of Regional Market Impact of EPA's
Clean Power Plan," working paper, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz,
CA, USA.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Noting the assumption that Ei < F < Ej, we have a
0 =   (F E1)
F E2 > 0, and b
0 = E1 E2
F E2 > 0.
Recall also the assumption that p0 < 0; p00  0; c0i > 0, and c00i  0. Let m(g1) denote the
left-hand side of Eq. (8). We rst calculate the derivative of m(g1):
m0(g1) = p0b0   c001   (E1   F )f 0
= p0b0   c001  
(E1   F )
E2   F

p0b0   c002a0

< 0:
(76)
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Thus, m(g1) is strictly decreasing, and g1, which is a solution to m
(g1) = 0 (or Eq. (8)),
is unique if an interior solution exists. Next, let mc(g1) denote the left-hand-side of Eq.
(13) and calculate the derivative as follows:
mc0(g1) = p0b0 + p0 + g1p00b0   c001   (E1   F )h0
= p0b0 + p0 + g1p00b0   c001  
(E1   F )
E2   F

p0b0 + ap00b0 + p0a0   c002a0

< 0:
(77)
Hence,mc(g1) is strictly decreasing, and g
c
1, which is a solution form
c(g1) = 0 (or Eq.(13)),
is unique if an interior solution exists. We now compare g1 and g
c
1 by calculating the
following:
mc(g1) m(g1) = p0g1   (h  f)(E1   F )
= p0g1   (E1   F )
E2   F ap
0
< 0:
(78)
Since mc(g1) < m
(g1), we obtain gc1 < g

1. We then compare g
c
1 and g
s
1 with the assump-
tion of interior solutions by calculating the following:
ms(g1) mc(g1) = g1(b0   1)p0   (E1   F )g1h0
=  (E1   F )
E2   F

p0 + p0b0 + ap00b0 + p0a0   c002a0

g1
< 0:
(79)
It follows from ms(g1) < m
c(g1) that g
s
1 < g
c
1 holds for any interior solutions. We, thus,
obtain gs1 < g
c
1 < g

1. Since a
0 > 0, g2 = a(g1) is strictly increasing. We, thus, have
gs2 < g
c
2 < g

2. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2
It is straightforward from Proposition 3.1 that gs < gc < g. Since p0 < 0, p(g) is strictly
decreasing. Hence, ps > pc > p holds. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3
From Eq. (3), e = E1g1 + E2g2 = Fg. Hence, e, which is a function of g, is strictly
increasing since e0 = F > 0. It follows from this and Proposition 3.2 that es < ec < e. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.4
We compare s and c by calculating the following:
s   c = h(gs1)  h(gc1)
=
1
E2   F
n
p(gs)  p(gc)

 

c02(g
s
2)  c02(gc2)

+

p0(gs)gs2   p0(gc)gc2
o
:
(80)
From Proposition 3.2, p(gs)   p(gc) > 0. It follows from the assumption c00i  0 and
Proposition 3.1 that c02(g
s
2)   c02(gc2)  0. From the assumption p00  0 and Proposition
3.2, we have p0(gs)  p0(gc)  0. Assuming an interior solution gs2 > 0, this inequality can
be further rearranged as follows:
p0(gs)gs2   p0(gc)gs2  0 (81)
p0(gs)gs2   p0(gc)gc2  p0(gc)(gs2   gc2) > 0: (82)
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The last inequality in (82) follows from the assumption p0 < 0 and Proposition 3.1. The
terms in the curly bracket in (80) are consequently positive and the sign of s c depends
on that of E2   F . Therefore, if E1 < F < E2, then s > c. If E1 > F > E2, we have
s < c. 2
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